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Abstract 
The European Union (EU) failed repeatedly to hold Greece accountable 
for violations of the Treaties it signed over the past five decades. In partic-
ular, the EU not only did not express reservations in the face of these vio-
lations, but on two crucial occasions, in 1979 and again in 2000, it even 
rewarded Greece with concessionary decisions, which contributed signifi-
cantly to its present calamities. Hence, there arises the following question: 
How can we explain these EU failures in the case of Greece? The objec-
tives of this paper are twofold: First, to highlight the circumstances which 
prompted the EU Authorities to treat Greece as a special case, and second, 
to sketch briefly the rudiments of an answer to the preceding question.  
 
JEL Classification: F02, O55 
Keywords: European integration, Europeanization, financial assis-
tance, convergence, institutional failure 
 
 
Correspondence:  Professor George C. Bitros 
Athens University of Economics and Business 
80 Patission Street, 6
th
 Floor, Athens 104 34, Greece 
Tel: ++30 210 8203740 Fax: ++30 210 8203301,  
E-mail: bitros@aueb.gr 
  
                                                     
1
    In arriving at the present version of this paper I benefited significantly from 
the insightful comments and editorial suggestions of D. Katsoudas and P. 
Vourloumis, as well as discussions with S. Manos, P. Mihas and M. Pelt. To 
all of them I should like to extend my sincere appreciation.  However, all re-
sponsibility for errors of fact of interpretation rests with me. 
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1. Introduction 
Prior to 1974 Greece achieved: high economic growth rates (≈ 7%); 
remarkable price stability (<2.5%), which enhanced the international com-
petitiveness of Greek products and services and maintained the balance of 
payments under manageable control; enviable reduction of unemployment 
(<2.5%); significant improvement and expansion of social services; and it 
achieved all these results by incurring a very limited public debt (<12.5% 
of GDP in 1974). After 1974, economic growth fell to about one third (≈ 
2.4%) and the unemployment rate more than doubled in the period 1980 (≈ 
6%), while in the decade of 2000 it nearly quadrupled (≈ 9%). The explo-
sive deficits in the Balance of Payments were contained only thanks to 
large EU aid, and the budget deficits carried public debt to unsustainable 
heights (≈ 150% of GDP in 2011). So now Greece is under the supervision 
and tutelage of her creditors.  
Some economists may think that the setback happened because, before 
1974, the Greek economy was nearly “closed”, whereas after its accession 
to EU membership in 1981 it opened to international competition.
2
 But the 
setback was mostly due to three groups of other factors. The first and most 
significant has to do with the resistance of Greek governments in introduc-
ing structural reforms in line with the “economic constitution” of the EU, 
i.e. the Treaty of Rome, particularly after 1975. The second is associated 
with the inefficiencies that took hold in the domain of public administration 
and the wider public sector; and, lastly, the third group of negative factors 
                                                     
2
   The European Union (EU) has evolved in many directions. Two of them are the 
number of participating countries (e.g., EU6 refers to the 6 founding member-
countries) and the nature of the union from an economic point view (e.g., the 
European Economic Community (EEC) was a custom union). Henceforth I 
shall refer generally to EU and to particular abbreviations like EEC only when 
needed for reasons of emphasis.  
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relates to the specific economic policies that were implemented. 
 This paper addresses the following issue: Greece signed an Associa-
tion Agreement with the EEC in 1961; this aimed at full membership with-
in 22 years.
3
 The agreement was partially frozen for seven years (1967-
1974) at the initiative of the EEC Commission as a reaction to the military 
regime that assumed power in Greece in 1967. It was re-entered into force 
upon the restoration of parliamentary democracy in 1974. Subsequently, 
Greece became a full member of the EEC in 1979 and of the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) in 2000.
4
 As noted above, in the course of these 
years Greece went from riches to rags. Most certainly the major share of 
the blame should be attributed to the failures of the authorities in Greece 
herself. But should the EU be absolved of all responsibility for what has 
happened? The objective here is to search for an answer.  
Section 2 pursues two tasks: First, it explains the challenges Greece 
faced at the time the Association Agreement was concluded in 1961; and, 
second, it assesses the effectiveness with which Greek governments dealt 
with these challenges, as well as the initiatives the EU authorities took to 
assist Greece in preparing for full membership in the 22 years that this 
agreement allowed. Sections 3 and 4 take up the same tasks as above for 
the periods of full membership and since 2000 when Greece acceded to the 
EMU. Then, in view the calamities that befell Greece in recent years, Sec-
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    In the preamble to the Agreement of Association the contracting parties recog-
nize that “The support given by the EEC to the Greek nation's efforts to im-
prove its standard of living will eventually facilitate the accession of Greece to 
the Community."  Furthermore, the contracting parties agreed to consider the 
possibility of accession: "when the operation of the Association Agreement 
makes it possible to envisage the integral acceptance by Greece of the obliga-
tions under the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community [GB: 
they meant the Treaty of Rome]." (Article 72)  
4
    The treaties of Greece’s accession to the EEC and to the Eurozone were rati-
fied in 1979 and 2000, and came into force in 1981 and 2002. 
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tion 5 poses and attempts to shed light on the following questions: If 
Greece was unprepared in 1981, and the evidence shows overwhelmingly 
that it was, why did the EU grant Greece a full membership status? Given 
that, from a structural point of view, the economy of Greece in the period 
1981-2001 was even worse than in the period 1961-1981,
5
 why did the EU 
give Greece the green light for the EMU? Since EU experts knew fully well 
after 2001 what was coming in view of the procrastination of Greek govern-
ments to adopt the necessary structural reforms, why did they not react on 
time but waited, instead, until after the crisis erupted?  Finally, Section 6 
summarises the findings and draws some conclusions. 
 
2. 1961-1981: What went wrong that the EU Authorities ignored    
The tariff regime that the Association Agreement established was favoura-
ble for Greece. In particular, the Agreement created a declining tariff ad-
vantage over a period of 12 years, which was designed to bring about two 
results: First, to give the Greek economy time to start growing through 
increased exports to the Community, and hence with lesser constraints to 
her Balance of Payments, and, second, to adjust to the more competitive 
countries of the EU, thus enabling it to stand on its own in the face of the 
demanding conditions within the Community. Eichengreen (2007), Geor-
gakopoulos (2002) and many other researchers have found that the agree-
ment yielded favourable effects for Greece, since it helped the products of 
her traditional industrial sectors gain shares in the EU markets and perhaps 
                                                     
5
   After 1974 Greece progressed further into a statist country. Gwartney, Hall, Lawson [2006] find, 
for example, that from 1980 to 2008 Greece with respect to: (a) property rights protection, fell the 
50th position from the 25th; (b) the conditions for commerce, mainly towards third countries, tum-
bled to the 80th position from the 39th; and (c) state regulations in credit markets, labour markets, 
and enterprises, slipped to the 90th position from the 72nd. It is also noteworthy that on the basis of 
price controls and barriers to entry, Mylonas, Papaconstantinou [2001] find that in 1998 Greece 
ranked as the most illiberal country in the European Union. 
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it contributed also to her rapid economic growth over this period. Howev-
er, when the usefulness of the Association was debated in the late 1950s, 
the issues regarding exports were neither the only issue nor the most im-
portant. The main focus of the debate was on the structural reforms that 
Greece would have to adopt in order to integrate smoothly into the Com-
munity within the 22 years of adjustment that were provided for in the 
agreement. To ascertain beyond any doubt that this was the case, here is 
how Papandreou (1962) summed up the challenge that Greece confronted 
at the time: 
 
"Greece has recently concluded an Association Agreement with 
the European Common Market with the prospect of full mem-
bership some 22 years hence. It is fair to say that, given the 
terms of the association, Greece has a small margin of time in 
which to achieve the structural transformations needed for sur-
vival in the European Common Market."(p. 25) 
 
Moreover, regarding the nature and range of the “structural transformations” 
that were needed, Papandreou (1962) was certain that these ought to be ori-
ented towards the social and economic environment envisaged by the Treaty 
of Rome.  Below is a sample of the reforms he considered urgent for Greece’s 
survival, not just in the Custom Union of EEC, but in the expected economic 
union, the “European Common Market”:  
   
“There is a pressing need to streamlining the presently cumber-
some “system” of government regulation of economic activity. 
In some sense there is “too much” government on the Greek 
economic scene, while there is too little research and too little 
planning, and the organizational apparatus for the execution of 
various plans is practically absent. The mosaic of fiscal credit 
and market regulations which are subject to abrupt changes 
without notice can hardly be expected to encourage private in-
vestment activity of the right kind.”(p.103) 
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“Where the market mechanism, the competitive process is al-
lowed to perform the resource-allocation task, it ought to be 
allowed to work. The rewards for success should be high – but 
so should be the penalties for failure. The barriers to entry – 
which in Greece reach unusual heights – ought to be lower if 
not removed. “Saturated” lines of endeavour and “closed” pro-
fessions ought to be exposed to the rigors of the competitive 
process.”(p. 104) 
 
“The overwhelming emphasis which is presently given to large 
and spectacular but narrow-scope projects must give way to a 
systematic exploration of the developmental possibilities of 
small  industry (including agriculture-based small indus-
try)…”(p. 104) 
 
“…It is essential to come to understand that an efficient export sec-
tor cannot be grafted upon an inefficient economy. Greece’s low 
capacity to export is a symptom of structural weakness, of resource 
misallocation, of missing links in the distribution chain – and 
should be handled as such. Special measures, such as preferential 
credit and fiscal treatment for export-oriented firms, while of 
doubtful effectiveness in the short-run, are often distinctly harmful 
in the long-run.”(p. 105)  
 
So, given that what had to be done was well-known to all parties who de-
cided to place Greece on a path of full EU membership, the question is: 
Did they rise to the challenge their responsibilities entailed? 
In Bitros (2013) I explain in considerable detail why and how Greek 
institutions failed miserably to deliver on this historic opportunity. The 
passing of the new Constitution in 1975, which gravely eroded property 
rights and set the stage for the expansion of the state and the destruction of 
private markets; the backtracking of Papandreou, who as leader of the Pan-
Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) in the 1970s proposed reforms 
opposite to the ones he recommended in his 1962 monograph; and the 
wide nationalizations of banks and industries that a supposedly conserva-
tive government introduced and the Confederation of Greek Industries 
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swallowed passively, are only a few examples of ill-conceived reforms that 
pushed the social and economic structures towards an organisation based  on 
central direction and control. If one finds this assessment subjective and prej-
udiced, one may be reminded of, say, the following assessment to which 
Georgakopoulos (2002) arrived upon examining the factors responsible for 
the bad performance of the Greek economy after 1981:  
“…besides, of course, the inappropriate economic policies, 
which do not seem to have initiated the troubles but which cer-
tainly led to a deterioration in the situation, a number of exter-
nal and internal factors could be mentioned, including the 1978 
and the 1985 oil price increases, the rise of the South Eastern 
Asia countries, which were producing a similar range of manu-
factured products at lower cost, the inappropriate model of 
Greece’s development in the post-war years etc. However, the 
most important factor seems to have been full membership of 
the European Community, something for which the economy 
was totally unprepared. This sounds strange for a country that 
has been an associate member of the European Economic 
Community for 20 years and was supposed to gradually align 
tariffs and prepare itself for the final accession as full member, 
while receiving substantial amounts of resources from the EU 
budget. Although the country was simply supposed to prepare 
itself to become a full member of the European Communities it 
was, in reality, totally unprepared.”  
Moreover, if these assessments are not convincing enough, one may be 
reminded that the “structural transformations” Papandreou (1962) called 
for 50 years ago are only now being introduced as an integral part of the 
multiple austerity programmes which have been imposed on Greece by 
her Creditors.    
Drawing on the above, the responsibility of Greek governments and 
their advisors who promoted publicly the advantages of Greece within the 
European family of nations, but, at the institutional level, did everything in 
their power to turn Greece into a quasi-collectivist state, is a fact, and it 
8 
 
will not escape the ire of historians in the future. However, what is of in-
terest here is the question if, and to what extent, responsibility lies also 
with the EU. When the European Commission “froze” the Association 
Agreement in 1967 reacting to the imposition of military rule in Greece, 
the message was clear and loud: It stressed the commitment of the EU to 
democracy, and, by doing so, it created a precedent for all European na-
tions with aspirations similar to those of Greece. Yet, after the restoration 
of Democracy in 1974 and the re-activation of the Association Agreement, 
the European authorities failed to notice that the institutional changes in 
Greece were inconsistent with the main pillars of the Treaty of Rome. Let 
me explain: Bitros and Karayiannis (2013) establish that Democracy is 
impossible to take root and flourish without a free market economy. Quite 
expectedly this finding explains why the founding fathers of the EU con-
structed the Treaty of Rome on the twin pillars of democracy and the free 
market economy. However, as mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the 
institutional changes in Greece, particularly after 1974, worsened its struc-
tural imbalances even further than in 1961. The barriers to entry into mar-
kets became higher and more widespread. The shielding” of professions 
became universal. Individual labour contracts were replaced by collective 
ones. With the acquiescence and support of governments Labor Unions, par-
ticularly in the public sector, grew gigantic and interlocked with the political 
parties in a way rendering them uncontrollable, and so on. In view of these 
changes Greece not only became oblivious of her obligations under the Treaty 
of Rome, but also distanced herself from them by moving in the opposite di-
rection. Therefore, the European authorities, as guardians of the Treaty, ought 
to have warned Greece on the provisions highlighted in footnote 2 above. 
Perhaps they did express their displeasure through official channels; but noth-
ing openly enough for Greek citizens to hear and nothing in the nature of a 
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friendly but candid reminder that Greece was going astray.
6
  
This implies that the relevant European authorities experienced a nota-
ble failure. It was a failure by omission which could have been mitigated 
only if Greece had not been granted full membership status in 1979.
7
 Was 
their decision justified? On account of all available evidence it was not, 
since from a structural point of view Greece’s economy in 1981 was in a 
worse state than in 1961, and further away from the imperatives of the Treaty 
of Rome. During the period 1961-1981, per capita income in Greece con-
verged significantly to that of the EEC average. Yet, even though improve-
ment in living standards might have created optimism among European politi-
cians and technocrats regarding Greece’s ability to survive within the Europe-
an common market, the EU authorities ought to have disallowed Greece from 
entering into the EEC totally unprepared as she was.  Why did they do so is an 
issue to which I will return later, in Section 5.  
 
3. 1981-2001: Divergence instead of convergence   
The Agreement of Accession of Greece to the EEC came into effect in 
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   This criticism applies mainly to EU’s leaders, since from official documents 
we know that the technocrats in the European Commission expressed strong 
reservations about the preparedness of Greece to enter as a full member into 
the EEC. For example, According to the opinion that the European Commis-
sion presented to the Council in January 1976: 
 
“The Greek economy at its present stage of development contains a 
number of structural features which limits its ability to combine ho-
mogeneously with the economies of the present member states.”(p. 8)  
 
7
   Whatever the failings and derelictions were on the part of the EU during the 
period of association, certainly they do not absolve the Greek side of its re-
sponsibilities. However, failure to act early on by the EU might have been in-
terpreted by Greeks as encouragement to continue. The time element is im-
portant because, the deeper one slips into a bad situation, the harder it becomes 
for one to adopt the necessary remedies to get out of it.   
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1981. In that year, PASOK won the elections and Papandreou
8
 as its 
leader became Prime Minister. While serving as head of the main oppo-
sition party after 1974, Papandreou had taken a highly anti-American 
and anti-European stance. Actually he won the elections claiming that 
the EEC and NATO “represented the same evil syndicate”, and upon his 
proclamations to take Greece down to a Third-World socialist path. In 
this political climate, and being as astute as he was, it did not take him 
long to conclude that: (a) Greece commanded certain geopolitical ad-
vantages that he could leverage in return for EU accommodation with his 
policies; (b) since the EU had condoned the strongly interventionist poli-
cies of previous Greek governments, no issues regarding convergence 
along the  lines mandated by the Treaty of Rome would be raised, and 
(c) given the wide gap in living standards that existed at the time, and the 
cost Greece would absorb by opening her markets to European competi-
tion, a strong case could be made for renegotiating the terms of the Ac-
cession Agreement as well as asking for generous financial assistance. 
The EU refused to renegotiate the Accession Agreement but, pretty 
much, gave in to all other demands made by Papandreou’s governments 
in the 1980s. It thus established a precedent of ill-conceived concessions 
that contributed significantly to the inertia towards that lead to the pre-
sent calamities of Greece. The following examples suffice to highlight 
the nature and extent of EU responsibility in the face of the behaviour 
and practices of Greek governments regarding Greece’s obligations vis-
a-vis of the Treaty of Rome.   
 
                                                     
8
  By then he had forgotten what he wrote in Papandreou (1962) and many other 
books as a research economist with top notch international reputation. In retro-
spect, it now seems that once he turned to politics, nothing was more useful 
for him than the means and the slogan to stay in power.     
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3.1 The debacle of financial assistance  
A central policy objective of the EU has been to promote the convergence 
of the economies of the member-states at the national and regional levels. 
The implementation of this policy is pursued by various means, including 
the provision of financial assistance. Table 1 below shows the net assis-
tance Greece received annually over the period 1981-2010 as a percentage 
of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). From these figures it turns out that 
the assistance averaged 2.7 percent of GDP per annum, a very generous 
percentage by any comparison. Were the objectives of these policies and 
generous financing achieved in Greece? Or, to put it differently, did this 
huge transfer of resources help Greece converge at the national or regional 
level? Let me work out the answer, first with respect to convergence at the 
national level.  
 
Table 1: Net
1
 inflows of financial aid from the Euro-
pean Union as a percentage of GDP 
 
1981 0,003 1991 0,046 2001 0,031 
1982 0,012 1992 0,039 2002 0,027 
1983 0,016 1993 0,044 2003 0,020 
1984 0,016 1994 0,041 2004 0,022 
1985 0,017 1995 0,035 2005 0,016 
1986 0,024 1996 0,048 2006 0,021 
1987 0,029 1997 0,039 2007 0,018 
1988 0,025 1998 0,039 2008 0,020 
1989 0,029 1999 0,043 2009 0,009 
1990 0,032 2000 0,043 2010 0,013 
Sources: 1. Ministry of Finance, Introductory Report of the Budget, 
Athens, various issues. 
2. GDP from the AMECO data base. 
Notes: 1. This term implies that the amounts of funds used to com-
pute the percentages  in this table are net of the annual 
contributions of Greece to the EU budget 
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Suppose that the trend growth rate of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 
in Greece was nil throughout the 1981-2001 period. Then, from the growth 
accounting point of view, her GDP would be expected to grow at the trend 
rate at which the above EU assistance flowed into Greece. This implies 
that GDP would be increasing at the trend rate of 2.7%, and, given that 
population did not increase much, per capita income would be growing 
roughly at the same rate. Hence, if the trend rate of growth in the EU dur-
ing the same period fell, say, in the neighbourhood of 2%, Greece would 
have converged to EU average living standards, albeit at a slower rate than 
in the period 1961-1981, when the trend growth rate in Greece was much 
higher than in the EU. Did this expectation come true? No; definitely not. 
According to the European Commission (2003, 7) Greece converged by 
5.94% and 2.34% in the periods 1960-1970 and 1970-1980 respectively; 
diverged by 6.13 in the period 1981-1990; converged by 1.14%   in the 
period 1990-2003; and most certainly it must have diverged greatly since 
2003 due the deep recession in recent years. Therefore, on account of this 
analysis it is reasonable to conclude that the EU failed to steer Greek govern-
ments into channelling the financial assistance into growth promoting invest-
ments, instead of using it mostly for consumption purposes. 
Turning next to the presumed convergence among various regions of 
Greece, the evidence from the available literature is in favour of the view 
that the divergence actually widened. For example, Siriopoulos, Asteriou 
(1998) and Petrakos, Rodriguez-Pose (2003) find divergence among Greek 
regions for the periods 1970-1996 and 1981-1997, respectively, and the 
same trend is reported by Petrakos, Psycharis (2006) using improved data 
and more sophisticated econometric techniques. Thus, given that a large 
share of the EU assistance was earmarked for projects that sought to pro-
mote convergence of the less to the more affluent regions of Greece, these 
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findings indicate that the policy failed at this level as well, and indeed not 
without EU responsibility, for three reasons: First, because the EU designed 
and put in place the allocation mechanisms of the assistance. Second, be-
cause EU had final authority for approving the projects and monitoring their 
implementation; and third, because the EU failed to prevent the widespread 
abuses that accompanied the administration of the assistance by successive 
Greek governments. 
Furthermore, with regard to the last point, it is important to note that, 
even worse than the failure of the financial assistance to boost convergence, 
were its unintended effects on the attitude of citizens and on the integrity of 
the relatively feeble institutions that existed in Greece. Today it is customary 
for foreigners to refer to Greece as a highly corrupt and inefficient country. 
But few wander what the easy money of financial assistance would do to 
their countries and institutions, if the donors trusted that governments would 
abstain from the temptation to use the assistance unscrupulously in order to 
perpetuate their presence in government.  The astonishing realisation though 
is that, in the case of Greece, the EU Authorities failed badly, because had 
they read the report that Porter (1947) submitted to the USA administra-
tion, they would have concluded that Greek governments could not be 
trusted to put in place the necessary mechanisms for utilising the assis-
tance effectively and without compromising its intended purposes.  
 
3.2 Structural reforms in reverse 
In the late 1970s, the few domestic economists who were openly support-
ers of the free market economy reckoned that, despite the high adjustment 
costs that would be involved, full membership in the EEC was valuable 
and useful because, as, at last, Greek governments would be forced to in-
troduce structural reforms in the directions foreseen by the Treaty of 
14 
 
Rome. They were badly disappointed. Soon after the Pan-Hellenic Social-
ist Movement (PASOK) took over in 1981, Papandreou’s government 
started to replace competition by administrative controls in every market 
that had escaped the “socialmania”9 after 1974. They introduced direct 
price controls in a wide range of markets. They expanded the range of the 
so-called “closed” professions and promoted -with taxpayer money- the 
formation of labour unions. They nationalised Skaramanga Shipyards and 
named them “Peoples Shipyards”. They established state enterprises to 
promote barter trading and to control the prices of imported goods like, 
coffee. They attempted, unsuccessfully, to abolish intermediation in farm 
produce; and in general with their policies they showed their disdain for 
the fundamental market principles the EU stands for. 
I did not mention above the indirect nationalisation in 1983 of 67 by 
then problematic business concerns, with the presumptuous intention to 
return them to the private sector after restructuring.
10
 I did it intentionally 
because I wished to stress that, even though this policy was profoundly in 
violation of the Treaty of Rome, the relevant EU Authorities stayed away 
and did nothing to prevent it. For, here you had a state organisation saving 
private enterprises from bankruptcy, thus diluting competition and promot-
                                                     
9
    This term was used to describe the extensive nationalisations that were under-
taken by the supposedly conservative government of Constantine Caramanlis. 
10
  Through the so-called Organization for the Restructuring of Enterprises 
(ORE), besides nationalizing healthy companies such as the Heracles Cement 
Company, PASOK used the control of the National Bank of Greece and other 
big banks to nationalize nearly bankrupt groups of companies such as Piraiki-
Patraiki, which were kept alive by loans not justified on “business” terms.  
This was done in order to avoid unemployment in politically sensitive areas. 
From the 67 enterprises that were taken over by ORE, all but 3, which are still 
running with government supports, have shut down. Unfortunately, this policy, 
i.e. of not allowing the natural death of moribund enterprises for reasons of po-
litical expediency, has been followed by all subsequent governments and as a 
result, to some extent, we are faced with the same problem today.  
15 
 
ing a policy which benefited the politicians, the shareholders and the 
workers involved, and sent the bill to the taxpayers.
11
  
At the end of the 1980s the structural divergence of Greece peaked and 
mainstream politicians, who worried about the continuing stagnation of 
economic growth and the huge public deficits that pushed public debt to 
unsustainable levels, started to talk about market-oriented structural re-
forms. The first government that embraced liberalisation, deregulation and 
privatisation was the one under Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis, 
which governed from 1990 to1993. However, as it was burdened with the 
mess left over by Papandreou’s governments and ministers from the old 
statist guard, it didn’t accomplish much in the above fronts;12 nor were any 
meaningful structural reforms undertaken by the governments that fol-
lowed, even though Prime Minister Costas Simitis, as head of subsequent 
PASOK governments, committed very frequently to act. Thus, with the 
full acquiescence of the EU Authorities, the structure of the Greek econo-
my became exceedingly unfit for survival in the competitive environment 
of world and EU markets.
13
  
 
3.3 Scary imbalances  
In recent years there has been a lot of talk about the so-called “Greek sta-
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    Modest estimations show that the cost to taxpayers from the operations of the so-
called Organisation for the Reconstruction of Enterprises reached 3 billion Euros.   
12
   Mitsotakis’s government had only a one seat majority in the parliament. As a 
result, it was politically weak and it could not control the powerful unions in 
the wider public sector, and most particularly in the electricity, telephone and 
transportation state-owned enterprises. This experience should have given am-
ple warning to the EU authorities regarding the structural deformities that 
dominated labor and other markets in Greece. 
13
   In the late 1990s numerous researchers stressed that even before entering 
the European Monetary Union (EMU) Greece had more regulations of markets 
for goods and services and more of labour markets than any country in the EU. 
On this, see for example Nicoletti, Scarpetta, Boylaud (1999).   
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tistics”. In Bitros (2013) several economists take a look at the statistics 
that are available to domestic and international researchers and find no 
irregularities, with the exception of a few times series which are politically 
sensitive. In this category falls the time series of public deficits, because 
Greece is suspected of having met the limit set by the Treaty of Maastricht 
untruthfully, i.e. by understating the size of the deficit in the budget of the 
central government in the observation year 1999. However, even though 
the doubts expressed by Eurostat in this respect are legitimate under the 
light of the available evidence, this debate is beside the point, because 
there were plenty of data out there which showed that Greece was diverg-
ing, and hence its admission into the Eurozone ought to have been delayed 
or even abandoned.  
For a solid example, consider the time paths of the main components of 
the external balance, which are exhibited in Figure 1. From this it turns out 
that after 1985 Greece lost competitiveness to such an extent that by 2001  
its deficit in the Balance of Payments was close to 15% of Gross National 
17 
 
Product (GNP). By virtue of this all-inclusive index of performance, any 
economist would have concluded that the economy of Greece was marred 
by wide imbalances, structural and otherwise, that the country was mar-
ginalised by European and global competition, and that her governments 
worsened the situation because of their hard core statism and their ideolog-
ical abhorrence of free markets. Yet, against all warnings, the EU in 2000 
gave Greece the green light to enter into the EMU. 
  
4. 2002-to date: Greece in the EMU  
Concerned from the continuous postponement of structural reforms, a few 
economists and business leaders broke their criticism in the open. I myself 
started already from the second half of the 1990s to warn with repeated 
essays in the Sunday newspaper “TO BHMA” about the undesirable eco-
nomic and social consequences, if Greece entered into the Eurozone un-
prepared.
14 
 While I was supportive of the government’s efforts to achieve 
fiscal adjustment, the lack of any progress in the front of structural reforms 
stirred my worst fears about the disinflation that would erupt sometime in 
the next few years. Unfortunately, not only the EU Authorities failed to 
exert pressure on Greek governments to introduce the necessary structural 
reforms, but, on the contrary, encouraged by various short-sighted techno-
crats they made reassuring proclamations that relieved Greek governments 
from the urgency to act. In support of this assertion, here is a quotation 
from the introduction of Jacques Delors, President of the European Com-
mission, to the paper by Pagoulatos (2002): 
 
                                                     
14
  In addition to my essays in the popular press, in Bitros (1992) and again in 
Bitros, Korres (2002) I spared no effort to warn about what would be the 
awful predicament, if Greek governments failed to introduce the necessary 
structural reforms.  
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“From now on, we must forget the stereotypes of Greece’s mar-
ginalization in the Union because they are obsolete. I share the 
author’s assessment of the current position of Greece in Europe 
as a success story, whether this be in items of to its political, 
economic or administrative evolution, its integration into the 
EMU and the single market or its international stance. I also 
know the huge role Prime Minister Kostas Simitis has played in 
this success, which I feel should be emphasized in this brief 
forward.” 
 
After this ebullient view of the prospects of Greece in the Eurozone, there 
can be no surprise that fiscal aggregates derailed again for good. For those 
who still doubt that the EU bears a good measure of responsibility, Figure 
2 shows how the current tragedy of Greece started to evolve right after 
2002. In particular, starting from 1993 in the years of observation 1998-
1999 governments managed to shrink public deficits (in figure 2 it is 
shown as declining negative public savings, i.e. borrowing) well enough to 
achieve the admission of Greece into the Eurozone. But, subsequently, 
public deficits accelerated until in recent years they exploded and brought 
Greece to the brink of open bankruptcy. To corroborate further that this 
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assessment is based on solid evidence rather than on casual observation, 
here is one of the many sharp verdicts Katsimi, Moutos (2010, 569) arrive 
at in their very meticulous study: 
“The Greek economy entered the second phase of the pre-EMU 
accession period in 1994 with both a large public debt and a 
large budget deficit, and went through a reduction of 9 percent-
age points (of GDP) in its budget deficit between 1993 and 
1999 in order to be admitted to the euro area. Unfortunately, 
these efforts were to a large extent abandoned in subsequent 
years. This was because, in the pre-EMU accession phase, the 
threat of exclusion acted as a hard budget constraint that forced 
the Greek government to redress its fiscal imbalances. In con-
trast to the output-driven, “hard-conditionality” of the pre-
accession period, the EMU period was characterized by the 
“soft-conditionality” of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), 
which allowed Greece even more than other governments to 
breach both the letter and the spirit of the Pact.”  
 
In other words, as Greece had done in the past with the Treaty of Rome 
(1957), it violated repeatedly the letter and the spirit of the Stability and 
Growth Pact (1997) and yet EU leaders looked the other way.  
 
5. Why EU treated Greece as a special case  
The presentation in the preceding three sections leaves no doubt that the 
EU Authorities failed repeatedly to hold Greek governments accountable 
for violations of the Treaties Greece signed with the EU over the past five 
decades. In particular, not only they did not remain aloof in the face of 
these violations, but, in two crucial occasions, in 1981 and 2000, they even 
rewarded Greece with concessionary decisions. In this light the question that 
comes to mind is this:  How can one explain these failures of the EU in the 
case of Greece? The objective below is to describe briefly the rudiments of 
certain possible explanations.   
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5.1 Tying Greece to the West  
History books suggest that on the basis of the agreement reached by the great 
powers that won the Second World War, i.e. The United States of America 
(USA), the United Kingdom (UK) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics (USSR), Greece came under the influence of the USA and UK. From the 
relevant literature it is also known that the USA took the lead in the recon-
struction of Greece by providing substantial financial assistance through the 
Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan up to 1952 and with lesser amounts of 
aid in the following years. Finally, from Pelt (2003) we learn that sometime in 
the second half of the 1950s the USA relinquished much of its influence in 
Greece to West Germany and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) with the understanding that they would exercise responsibility for 
keeping Greece tied to the West. According to Pelt (2003), the admission by 
West Germany of nearly 300.000 Greek immigrants, the considerable invest-
ments German firms started to undertake in Greece and the Agreement of Asso-
ciation with the EEC in 1961, were policies which affirmed the influence West 
Germany gained in Greece for itself and on behalf of NATO and the EEC.  
In 1974 the invasion of Cyprus by Turkey provoked the downfall of the 
military regime, which ruled in Greece since 1967, and the return to democra-
cy under a provisional government headed by Karamanlis. Due to the anti-
American climate that prevailed at the time, Karamanlis withdrew Greece 
from the military wing of NATO.  However, shortly afterward he declared 
publicly and forcefully that “Greece belonged to the West”, he asked for reac-
tivation of the 1961 Agreement of Association with the EEC, and, simultane-
ously, he petitioned the starting of negotiations for full membership. These 
moves could be interpreted as a reaffirmation of the status quo in the region 
and as a warning to the leaders of the EU in general, and West Germany in 
particular, as to what might happen, if they failed to admit Greece to the EEC. 
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Most likely, therefore, the Agreement of Accession in 1981 was concluded on 
the same geopolitical imperatives with those that led to the Agreement of As-
sociation in 196.
15
  
In short, despite the errors of USA foreign policy in Greece and Cy-
prus, and despite the gross violations of the Treaty of Rome by Karaman-
lis’s post-1974 governments, with their decision in 1981 EU leaders 
sought to keep Greece tied to the West. 
 
5.2 Giving in to Papandreou’s blackmail and Simitis’ charm   
When, in the elections of 1974, Papandreou introduced his slogan against 
EEC and NATO, as well as his other proclamations about turning Greece into 
a third world socialist state, actually he was posturing to secure that EU and 
NATO: (a) would not interfere in the electoral process; (b) would not raise 
objections to the statist economic policies he intended to apply, and (c) 
would continue to provide financial and other assistance. Since the cold 
war continued and the plans of USSR for expansion in this region did not 
show signs of abatement, EU leaders gave in to Papandreou’s blackmail 
and Karamanlis’ warnings.16 
The above scenario explains rather convincingly the EU decision re-
garding the 1981 Agreement of Accession and the generous financial as-
sistance that followed. But it is less illuminating regarding the EU decision 
in 2000 to admit Greece into the EMU because, by the early 1990s, Pa-
                                                     
15
   Perhaps it is of some importance to note that Greece re-entered into the mili-
tary branch of NATO on October 22, 1980.  
16
   A reader has suggested that the EU decision in 1981 may have been influenced 
also by two additional factors: Namely, the interest of certain key European 
leaders in the purchases of military equipment by Greece, and the solidarity among 
socialist parties which were coming to power at the time. Perhaps they did play 
some role. But there is no way of knowing and in any case, with the major chal-
lenges that Greece presented, their influence could not be more than marginal.   
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pandreou’s threats had waned and Greece’s geopolitical significance had 
started to decline under the new trends precipitated by the dissolution of 
the USSR in 1991. Regarding these trends, remember that in the 1990s 
Russia lost its superpower status and became entangled in serious econom-
ic problems. The USA became dominant in the world and, with the coop-
eration of the EU, started upgrading Turkey into a regional power. The 
stance of Greece in various Balkan issues rendered its friends in the West 
nervous, etc. So how can we explain the EU decision in the year 2000? I 
can think of two possible explanations: The first is that EU leaders gave in 
to the charms of Simitis, who, in 1996 took over as Prime Minister of the 
PASOK government, replacing Papandreou who was seriously ill. Since 
within a few years Simitis managed to bring about successfully the re-
quired macroeconomic adjustment and Greece met the Maastricht criteria, 
why doubt that he would deliver also in due course on the structural re-
forms? Simitis needed encouragement to continue with these reforms and 
with their positive decision they showed full confidence in his leadership. 
The second explanation is the following. 
 
5.3 A latent strategy for Greece’s Europeanisation  
From a structural point of view Greece was unprepared to enter into the 
Eurozone. After it entered, economists knew that, if Greek governments 
procrastinated in adopting the necessary structural reforms, eventually the 
consequences would be domestic deflation in the form of significant unde-
sirable adjustments in the real wages and in the rate of unemployment. In 
addition economists knew that domestic deflation would become neces-
sary sooner than later depending on the size of public deficits and debt. 
Hence, EU leaders guessed that, if Greek governments failed in the front 
of structural reforms and went over a fiscal cliff, there was a real possibil-
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ity that their countries might be called upon at some point to bail Greece 
out. Still they decided to let Greece enter into the Eurozone. My proposi-
tion is that they did so because, if the case came down to bailing Greece 
from bankruptcy, they believed that the cost would be well worth it. Why 
would that be so? An answer is that, it would give them the opportunity to 
control the terms of Greece’s true Europeanisation once and for all.  
 
5.4 Natural resources and markets  
The going for Greeks is tough now because, in addition to the economic 
sacrifices and the suffering from unemployment, the structural reforms 
underway demand of them to change their habits and thinking. In this un-
settled climate, politicians, opinion makers and media with adversarial 
views, genuine or contrived, regarding the Europeanisation of Greece, at-
tempt to gain followers by claiming that the EU is after our “natural re-
sources” and “markets”. Their arguments regarding “markets” are baseless in 
the prevailing globalised environment of open economies and can be ignored, 
but not their claims regarding “natural resources”.   
Europe has few natural resources of its own compared to other parts of 
the world. As a result, since minerals and fossil fuels play a central role in 
the economy, securing such resources in adequate and uninterrupted supply 
has been a very high priority in the EU. Depending on the changes in produc-
tion technologies and goods produced, the list of minerals which are consid-
ered critical from one period to the other changes. From the Molinares report 
of Buijs, Sievers (2011) it turns out that the list of critical minerals in the last 
40 years included gold, bauxite, chromium, platinum, cobalt, manganese, 
tungsten, phosphate, lithium, etc. The question then is: Has Greece deposits of 
fuels and critical minerals in such quantities that might motivate the EU to 
overlook Greece’s violation of its membership obligations?  
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The key resources in Greece include iron ore, lignite, zinc, lead, baux-
ite, nickel, petroleum and magnesite. In 2010, Greece was the world’s 
fourth largest producer of pumice and a leading producer of perlite; it pro-
duced about 1% of the world’s bauxite and 9% of the world’s bentonite, 
whereas it held a leading position in Europe in the production of Nickel. 
But from these only bauxite and nickel have surfaced systematically in the 
lists of critical minerals.  
A feasibility study in 2006 established that Greece can become the top 
producer of gold in the EU. Also, various reports in the last few years have 
foreshadowed good prospects for the discovery of petroleum and gas de-
posits. But these possibilities are still in the exploratory phase. Therefore, 
based on the above, it is unlikely that the availability of fossil fuels and miner-
als played any significant role in the EU decisions with regard to Greece.   
 
5.5 History and civilisation  
In Bitros, Karayiannis (2010, 2013) we established that the wealth and the 
marvels of ancient Athens that we admire so much today resulted from the 
ingenious combination ancient Athenians achieved of democratic institu-
tions with an outward looking economy based on free markets. By impli-
cation, Greeks knew and practiced the principles of democracy and of free 
market economy on which the EU is founded long before any other Euro-
pean nation. To be sure, in the decades since the uprising and the liberation 
from the Ottoman Empire in 1821, Greeks failed to set up a well-organised 
state. But, time and again, when major world conflicts in the 20
th
 century 
threatened the foundations of democracy and individual freedoms, Greeks 
were there on the side of the nations that defended these values, appearing in 
the European eyes in the battlefields to be true descendants of ancient 
Greeks. Thus, based on the way cultured people in the West think about 
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Greece when it comes to defending democracy, one cannot preclude that 
Greece’s history swayed some most critical EU decisions in her favour.   
Nor is it likely that Greece’s contribution to civilisation could leave Eu-
ropean leaders and intelligentsia unmoved; and I do not mean only the 
place in their hearts of the Titans of Greece’s ancient philosophers, trage-
dians, physicists, mathematicians, etc. For, contemporary Greece has a 
vivid cultural presence, which is amply evidenced by her world-renowned : 
poets, like Kavafy and the two Nobel laureates Seferis and Elytis; authors, like 
Kazantzakis, whose books have been translated widely all over the world; 
symphony orchestra conductors and opera singers Mitropoulos and Callas; 
composers like Skalkotas, Theodorakis and Hatzidakis, etc. In short, Greece is 
a small country which has made a disproportionately large contribution to 
Western civilization, not only in ancient but also in modern times. Therefore, 
EU leaders, most of whom have been raised on the “classics”, may have a 
tendency to treat Greece as a special case because of her overall presence in 
the world, downplaying the problems of her economy.  
 
5.6 Greece is “too small to matter” 
The argument outlined above, according to which EU Authorities took a 
bet when they decided in 2000 to admit Greece into the Eurozone, gains 
support from still another consideration. This emanates from the realisa-
tion that, since Greece has very small weight relative to the mass of the 
EU, whatever social and economic shocks might arise from her side they 
would be utterly unlikely to cause any problem for the EU as a whole. Ex-
pressing the same thought differently, if an expert stood in 2000 and 
looked into the future of the common currency, no matter how smart and 
knowledgeable, he could not have imagined a situation where the misman-
agement of Greece’s economy would have created the possibility of bring-
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ing down the European, and through it the international financial system.
17
 
However, in the last four years, experience has shown that, from the mis-
management of big banks in the USA, which were thought to be “too big 
to fail”, to the mismanagement in the EU of a small economy like that of   
Greece, which was thought to be “too small to matter”, such possibilities 
do exist and, if they are allowed to materialize, their consequences might 
be catastrophic for the democratic way of living.  
To conclude, in 2000 EU experts and leaders could not have been 
aware of the risks that the failure of a small economy like Greece might 
cause a cascading failure, which could potentially bring down the entire 
European monetary system. No one knew of the existence of such “sys-
temic risks”, so most likely they took the bet by underestimating the cost 
of bailing out Greece in case she went bankrupt. Hence, in this light, it is 
not surprising that the leaders of Germany and France find it hard to ex-
plain to their citizens why they will have to share in the costs for prevent-
ing the open bankruptcy of Greece.  
 
5.7 Massive EU institutional failure 
The presentation in Section 4 established beyond reasonable doubt that 
Greece violated systematically the letter and the spirit of all treaties she 
signed with EU in the last five decades. In the preceding sub-sections I 
commented on several conceptualisations which have been advanced in 
the literature in order to explain the crucial decisions of EU leaders to ad-
mit Greece to the EEC in 1979 and to the Eurozone in 2000.  However, 
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  To be sure, the possibility of a so-called “butterfly effect”, according to which 
a small and insignificant disturbance somewhere in the world might cumulate 
under certain circumstances into a major catastrophic event, was long known 
to experts. But at the time there was no precedent of such an occurrence hap-
pening in actuality, so it would be quite farfetched to hold European leaders 
and technocrats responsible for not allowing for it in advance.      
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nothing that has been said so far precludes the likelihood that the EU re-
sponsibility for what happened in Greece may lie with the implementation 
and monitoring mechanisms which have been setup to make sure that 
country-members abide by their obligations.  
In this respect, one should be reminded that much ink has been wasted 
as to whether Greece provided her partners with the correct data regarding 
public deficit and debt prior to entering the Eurozone. But these issues are 
secondary to the violations that the Greek political class committed in fail-
ing to advance the agenda of the Treaty of Rome and the necessary struc-
tural reforms, which would have made Greece a viable member of the Eu-
rozone. Didn’t the administration in Brussels see what was happening in 
the 1980s and 1990s with the mess Greek governments made of the Greek 
economy? Didn’t they see the massive frauds in the usage of the Commu-
nity assistance and the wasteful projects to which it was directed? How 
could they cooperate in the destruction of the Greek agriculture without 
insisting in its timely restructuring? These and numerous other questions 
need to be addressed soon by the European Commission in the spirit of 
democratic accountability.  For, until they do so, European citizens living 
in Greece will be entitled to suspect that they are victims of a massive EU 
institutional failure, since a country as ill prepared as Greece was admitted 
into the monetary union.
18
  
 
6. Summary of findings and conclusions 
In 2000 the structure of the Greek economy was further away from what 
was envisioned in the Treaty of Rome than it was in 1961. Markets were 
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   In other words, in the absence of such an assessment, Greek citizens are enti-
tled to suspect that the overwhelming emphasis placed on the view that Greece 
was admitted in the Eurozone on the basis of falsified statistics is a cheap ex-
cuse to avoid discussion of the substantive issues raised above.  
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regulated centrally by administrative controls, stifling competition and reduc-
ing the flexibility of the economy to adjust to domestic and external shocks. 
Professions were “closed” to protect the incomes of privileged minorities. The 
public sector in the narrow sense was oversised and operated extremely ineffi-
ciently, whereas the broader public sector was dominated by powerful labour 
unions, often holding the government and the citizens hostage, etc. Thus, in 
view of Greece’s demonstrable unpreparedness to join the Eurozone, only 
partly geopolitical but mostly reasons that can traced in significant EU in-
stitutional failures and underestimation of systemic risks explain why EU 
leaders decided to let it proceed.   
With their decision EU leaders took a bet. If Greek governments did in-
troduce the required structural reforms, Greece would transform herself 
into a true European country and all would be fine. If they didn’t, the time 
would come soon for domestic deflation and then they would have to bail 
out Greece in order to avert an open bankruptcy. But, in that eventuality, 
they would have the ability to dictate the terms and the speed of structural 
reforms. This is exactly what is happening now and the major likelihood is 
that, within a few years, Greece will turn into a truly European country. 
Unfortunately, the cost to the Greek people is much-much higher than if 
structural reforms had been introduced in smooth and timely fashion. But, 
in a democracy, the sovereignty of the people comes with a cost; the Greek 
people ought to have watched out for the integrity and the character of the 
leaders they elected all these years. In my view this explanation rationalis-
es exceptionally well the behaviour of EU leaders, as well as my predic-
tions all along that they would foot whatever bill for bailing out Greece. 
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